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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

yes

USSR-France: Pravda's first editorial comment on the French situation on 11 June suggests that the USSR is still being careful not to prejudice its future diplomatic relations with De Gaulle. Pravda focused its attacks on the French Committees of Public Safety. The Soviet press continues to publicize and implicitly endorse the increasingly sharp French Communist party line, however, and has printed Jacques Duclos' statement calling for Communist leadership of a united campaign against a De Gaulle-led fascist movement.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

yes

Lebanon: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold envisages that the UN observation group will establish watch posts inside Lebanon along roads to the troubled areas; it will not be a "police force" in the sense of the UNEF which patrols the Egyptian-Israeli borders. It is doubtful that such a group can effectively check on the flow of materiel and infiltrators into Lebanon from Syria. There have been no major changes in the internal military or political situation since 11 June.

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no

Cyprus: Initial reactions of the Greek and Turkish governments to the new British proposals on Cyprus, presented to them on 10 June, have been negative. Both regard the plan as unrealistic and impractical. On Cyprus rejection of the

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proposals is likely to set off a new wave of terrorism. A battalion of British paratroops is being sent to the island to bolster the security forces, and the injection of Turkish "volunteers" is becoming increasingly possible. [REDACTED]

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no

Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the near future. However, serious incidents are likely to recur. In Lebanon the continuing crisis represents a grave threat to the nation as presently constituted. There is evidence of continuing intervention by UAR irregulars and of the infiltration of considerable quantities of UAR arms. There is, however, no evidence of UAR intention to interfere with regular military forces, a step which may not be required for UAR purposes. Although there have been instances of more forceful action by the Lebanese armed forces, the latter have not been employed to the extent of their capabilities. Available evidence does not indicate an intention by the Soviet bloc or by Israel to become militarily involved. [REDACTED]

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yes

Afghanistan: A jet light bomber, identified as an IL-28, was observed over Kabul on 8 June with Afghan Air Force markings. Afghanistan has already received some 40 MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters. Pakistan will be concerned over the acquisition of bombers by the Afghan Air Force. [REDACTED]
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DAILY BRIEF

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no
Watch Committee conclusion--North Africa: The French-Tunisian situation remains tense, and a serious incident could lead to open hostilities between the two countries. No evidence is available of Soviet bloc efforts to exploit the current crisis in North Africa.

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III. THE WEST

no
De Gaulle-French Communism: The general's offer of a cabinet post to a General Labor Confederation leader, who is regarded by many as a crypto-Communist, alarmed leaders of the non-Communist unions. They fear De Gaulle lacks a basic understanding of Communism. De Gaulle's record indicates a wariness as to Communist objectives, but he considers himself a symbol of national reconciliation and probably will continue such gestures.

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

National Intelligence Estimate No. 27.1-58. The Outlook for Spain. 20 May 1958.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Attitude Toward De Gaulle Still Cautious


Moscow continues to be cautious in its public statements on De Gaulle in order to avoid prejudicing the possibilities of good relations with his government. A Pravda editorial on 11 June warned that the Committees of Public Safety present a serious danger to France but criticized De Gaulle's government only for "tolerating or encouraging" these organizations. While this line of criticism may persist, the editorial was probably written before the increase in friction between De Gaulle and the Algerian Committee of Public Safety.

Pravda also published its most extensive criticism of De Gaulle to date on 10 June, but in the form of an interview, originally in an East German paper, with French Communist leader Jacques Duclos. By this technique, Moscow is publicizing the Communist party's claim to be the most effective opponent of De Gaulle and is endorsing Duclos' instructions to the party without compromising its own tactic of cautious waiting with regard to De Gaulle.

Duclos charged the Pflimlin government and Socialist leaders Mollet and Auriol with capitulation to De Gaulle in the face of Communist willingness to defend the republic. He claimed that De Gaulle intends to use the Committee of Public Safety as the nuclei of a mass fascist movement since he lacks broad public support. He alleged that De Gaulle intends to follow an "ultracolonialist" policy and pursue the war in Algeria. Duclos called for unity among all working-class and republican forces under Communist leadership to prevent fascism and achieve peace in Algeria.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's quick action in sending an advance group of observers to Lebanon may have caught the anti-Chamoun opposition unprepared. However, opposition leaders are putting up a bold front and have said that they will debunk charges of intervention by the UAR and "prove" that Western intervention has "internationalized" the Lebanese situation. Meanwhile, the controlled Damascus press has charged that the UN Security Council is a "docile instrument in the hands of the imperialist powers." Cairo radio accuses the United States of sending "arms to murder the Lebanese people," while at the same time charging the UAR with interference.

Hammarskjold envisages the establishment of observation posts along roads to the troubled areas and hopes that the group will set to work in the immediate future. The advance group, composed of five officers borrowed from the UNTSO in Palestine, is in Beirut and will be augmented by additional observers. A Norwegian general has been asked to chair a three-man directorate, consisting also of an Ecuadorian and an Indian. The group will work only from the Lebanese side of the border. General Burns, UNEF commander in Gaza, has said he believes that about 5,000 men would be required for adequate surveillance of the Lebanese border. It is doubtful that the observation group will be able to operate effectively in the mountainous countryside, much of which is held by rebel forces. Hammarskjold has requested helicopters from US forces in Europe.

The center of fighting remains in the city of Tripoli and the rugged mountains behind Beirut. The forces of pro-Chamoun leader Mughabghab, which have been instrumental

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in holding up the Druze advance, are reported to have suffered heavy casualties and to have withdrawn from the struggle.

Reports persist that General Shihab is employing halfhearted measures designed to convey the impression of energetic action without really being effective. In the Moslem quarter of Beirut, opposition fighters are confident that the army will never make a major effort to take over their section of the city. They claim that the army permits them to receive arms shipments unmolested, and that army men even have advised them how to construct their defenses. They express distaste for all Lebanese political leaders and say their real leader is President Nasir.

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Cyprus

Long-awaited British proposals for Cyprus, presented in Athens and Ankara on 10 June, have met with unofficial Greek rejection and probably also face rejection in Ankara. Greek objections appear centered on the claim that the new plan contravenes the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne by formally recognizing Turkish interest in Cyprus. Turkish objection appears to be based on fear that Turkish Cypriots will eventually be placed under "the oppression of the Greek community" through its dominance of the proposed government.

A definite rejection of the British plan by any of those concerned could lead to new acts of terrorism on Cyprus and possibly a political crisis for the Greek Government. Premier Karamanlis predicts a violent reaction against his government when the proposals become known even if it rejects them outright. While Greek Foreign Minister Averoff indicates willingness to delay announcing his government's reaction to the proposals, it is less likely that Archbishop Makarios, also informed, will remain silent. Public denunciation of the plan by Makarios would probably unleash an all-out attack by EOKA against British, and possibly Turkish, targets on Cyprus.

Announcement of Turkish rejection of the plan could stimulate Turkish Cypriots to new acts of terrorism. In Turkey, where widespread mass demonstrations of students are planned during the next few days, nationalist speakers could inflame the crowds against the Greek minorities in Istanbul and Izmir. It is possible that "spontaneous" demonstrations will soon be held throughout Turkey calling for "volunteers" to come to the assistance of the Turkish Cypriots.

Meanwhile, communal clashes are continuing on Cyprus, and the British have announced that a battalion of paratroopers is being sent to bolster the 24,000 troops on the island.

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Afghan Air Force Acquires Soviet Twin-jet
Light Bomber

A twin-jet light bomber with Afghan markings, identified as a BEAGLE (IL-28), observed over Kabul on 8 June is the first firm evidence that Afghanistan has obtained one or more bombers from the USSR. It is not clear whether Afghanistan is receiving the BEAGLE under the Soviet arms loan of 1956 or under a new agreement. About 40 FAGOTS and FRESCOES (MIG-15's and MIG-17's), some of which are being used for training Afghan jet fighter pilots, have been delivered to Afghanistan since 1956.

The BEAGLE could be used for reconnaissance and ground support against possible tribal uprisings within Afghanistan. Its presence indicates that the Afghan Air Force is beginning a new stage in its program of modernization and expansion. The military airfield at Mazar-i-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, has a runway suitable for BEAGLE operations and another is being built at Bagram, 30 miles north of Kabul.

Pakistan will be concerned over the acquisition of a bomber by the Afghan Air Force, and may request earlier delivery and greater numbers of American jet light bombers now promised for late 1959 and 1960.

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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle's Attitude Toward the Communists

Non-Communist trade union leaders have expressed alarm at De Gaulle's statements to them that he had offered a cabinet post to Pierre Le Brun, a secretary of the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGT), and he regretted that Le Brun had not accepted because of CGT opposition. The non-Communist trade union leaders regard Le Brun as a secret member of the Communist party. They have the impression that De Gaulle lacks a basic understanding of Communism and views Communists from the "lofty heights of national unity," taking the attitude that "all are Frenchmen."

De Gaulle is known to consider himself a symbol of national reconciliation, but his anti-Communist record and wariness of Communist objectives have been long established. A notable example was his rejection of Communist demands in 1945 for the key posts of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior ministry. The general is probably anxious to obtain the general support or at least the acquiescence of labor for his program, and thus can be expected to continue conciliatory gestures toward the CGT, which represents by far the largest part of all organized workers.

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